W e consider a decision problem where a group of individuals evaluates multiattribute alternatives. We explore the minimal required agreements that are sufficient to specify the group utility function. A surprising result is that, under some conditions, a bilateral agreement among pairs of individuals on a single attribute is sufficient to derive the multiattribute group utility. The bilateral agreement between a pair of individuals could be on the weight of an attribute, or\ an attribute evaluation function, or on willingness to pay. We focus on the case in which each individual's utility function is additive. We show that the group utility can be represented as the weighted sum of group attribute weights and, more remarkably, of attribute evaluation functions. These group attribute evaluation functions are in turn weighted sums of individual attribute evaluation functions.
Introduction
In this paper, we focus on group decisions where a group of individuals or a committee collectively shares the responsibility for choosing among alternative proposals for action. Individual or committee members may have different views on the relative merit of each proposal. Therefore, the problem boils down to how one should aggregate the views/ preferences of the committee members to arrive at a preferred decision. Arrow (1963) and Sen (1970) have shown that, in general, there is no procedure for combining individual rankings into a group ranking without violating some rather reasonable assumptions. Interpersonal comparison of preferences is the Achilles' heel in escaping from the trap that Arrow's Impossibility Theorem has so eloquently laid out. In the spirit of Keeney and Raiffa (1976) , we will assume that individuals are willing to perform interpersonal comparisons of utility or welfare.
Our contribution is to provide explicit ways to elicit the utility comparisons to derive the group utility. We show that it is possible to restrict these utility comparisor\s at a pair level. Our strategy is to seek compromise and agreement on a chosen parameter from the two individuals comprising the pair. Thus, for example, two individuals who attach different importance weights to an attribute of interest are asked to compromise and to come up with an agreement on their common weight for the attribute in question.
This paper represents an important application of Baucells and Shapley's (2000) theory to multiattribute decision problems. Further, we provide decision-analytic procedures to elicit utility comparisons among individuals. Our results therefore could be directly adapted to practical applications of group decisions with multiple criteria.
We will assume that individual preferences satisfy the von Neumann-Morgenstern (1944) utility axioms. For organizational decisions, an individual may represent a department such as Marketing or R&D.
The individual would presumably reflect the preferences of the department. Marketing, for example, may believe that an early entry to market (attribute: time to market entry) is more important, but R&D may believe that the features of the introduced product (attribute: product features) is a more important attribute. The group utility (or company utility in this case) is derived by forming bilateral agreements that seek a compromise on the attribute weight. Thus, depending on the context of the decision, individual utility may reflect an impact on oneself, or an impact on the department or constituency that the individual represents, In §2, we summarize some key results of Baucells and Shapley (2000) that show how bilateral agreements among (n-1) pairs of individuals are enough to derive the group utility function. The operationalization of interpersonal weights through decision-analytic techniques is discussed.
In the remainder of this paper, we consider the multiattribute decision problem where the consequences or the outcomes of a decision are measured using multiple attributes. Examples include location of facilities, selection of a candidate, and choice of a new product or process technology. For numerous applications, see Keeney and Raiffa (1976) or the comprehensive Multiple Criteria Decision Aid Bibliography at http://www.lamsade. dauphine.fr/mcda/biblio/index.html. Many such decisions are group decisions. Benbasat and Lim (1993) and Dennis et al. (1996) perform a meta-analysis of 29 and 64 studies, respectively, and report the pros and cons of using group support systems for these decisions.
In §3, we assume that the individual multiattribute utility functions are additive; i.e., they can be expressed as the weighted sum of single-attribute evaluation functions (attribute utilities). A surprising result is that the group utility can be decomposed into a weighted sum of group attribute utilities. Clearly, a series of bilateral agreements are needed to derive group utility from individual utilities. Interestingly, agreements regarding all attribute weights and attribute utilities are not necessary. In fact, an agreement on the weight of any one chosen attribute, or on the trade-off between two attributes, may be sufficient to derive the multiattribute pair utility. For 1106 example, suppose time to market entry, product features, product performance, product reliability, and cost are relevant attributes for a new product introduction decision. Marketing is willing to pay $10 million to accelerate market entry by six months, whereas R&D prefers that the additional resources be spent on enhancing product features and is willing to pay only $5 million to facilitate early market entry. A bilateral agreement between the two departments may be to pay $8 million for an earlier introduction of the product. Given individual utilities of Marketing and R&D, the one bilateral agreement on trade-offs is sufficient to derive their joint utility. Consistency with the Extended Pareto Rule (EPR) and the additive structure of the multiattribute utility ensures that the agreement on the trade-offs among the other remaining attributes (say, cost and product features) cannot be arbitrary.
If a large number of individuals are involved in a group decision, pairwise comparisons may be too onerous. Section 4 shows how our framework can be extended to consider coalition agreements. Finally, in §5, we discuss some possible extensions of the present work. We begin by laying out the formal framework for our approach.
2. The Formal Framework 2.1. Setting Consider a set of individuals N = {1,2 , n\, with n > 2, who must jointly choose from a set of alternatives. The outcome of a decision is evaluated on m attributes, and therefore an outcome x = {x^,... ,x,,,) is a point in the outcome space X = X^ x Xj x • • • x X,,,, where X^, a = 1 to m, is the set of possible outcomes on the flth attribute. We assume X is finite. Each individual i's utility », is assumed to satisfy von Neumann-Morgenstern (1944) rationality requirements, 1/,: X -^ Re. The choice set X from which the individuals and the group choose a preferred course of action is the set of all probability distributions over X. We will use symbols x,y,z, etc. to denote both the deterministic outcomes as well as probability distributions over X. The expected value of ii, is used to determine individual i's preference over probability distributions or lotteries over X. We require that
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there are two consequences x and y so that all individuals strictly prefer . v to y. For simplicity of exposition, we will assume throughout that there is the least preferred consequence, .v", and the most preferred consequence, X", for all individuals and we can therefore set u^x*^) = 0, u,(x*) = 1, i = 1 to n.
It is clear that we have assumed that the preference relation >^, for individual / is complete and satisfies \'on Neumann-Morgenstern axioms. We will assume that preferences of each coalition S c N also satisfy von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms, except completeness (x ^ 1/ or y >^ x). Thus, a coalition will have a partial ordering or incomplete preferences over X. Incomplete preferences merely imply that the coalition is sometimes unable to express the direction of preference for certain pairs of alternatives.
A collection of preferences >is' S 9 N, satisfies the EPR if for all disjoint coalitions A and B, and for all X >A y. X and uB y.
(1) (2) It is clear that for n -2, the EPR reduces exactly to the well-known Pareto Rule. An implication of the EPR is that if we break a group into subgroups and if each subgroup prefers x to y, then the group as a whole should prefer x to y. We will use the EPR to derive group preferences from pair preferences.
Fair Preferences
Consider two individuals / and ; who are endowed with utility functions u, and u,, respectively. As shown in Harsanyi (1955) , if the pair preference >;;^, is complete and the Pareto Rule holds, then the joint utility »" takes the form u,^ ^aJw,+(l-aJ)Uj for some a' e (0,1). Baucells and Shapley (2000) extend this result to two disjoint coalitions A and B using EPR:
We now present an example of how aj can be elicited. Choose a consequence x so that w,{x) Ĥ ,(x) and without loss of generality, let «,(x) < Uj{x). The usual von Neumann-Morgenstern interpretation of utility implies that if individual ( is indifferent between x for sure and the binary lottery yielding x* (the best outcome) with a probability p, and yielding x° (the worst outcome) with a probability (1 -p/), then W((^) =Pc Similar interpretation holds for determining w,{x) =Pi. To elicit u,,(x) through a bilateral agreement, find a probability p^, € (p,,Pj)' so that as a pair, / and ; are indifferent between x for sure and the lottery yielding x' with a pij chance and . v*' with a (1 -p,j) chance. A compromise between individuals / and ; is needed to reach the common indifference probability, P;y. We note that p^ cannot take the extreme values of the interval because such an assignment (pij = pô r p,, =p^) would violate strong condition (2) of the EPR. To derive aj from p,,, observe that pjj = w,
It may not be immediately clear why a compromise on the utility of one outcome predetermines the compromise on the utility of other outcomes. We show by means of an example that the Extended Pareto Principle will be violated if the compromise on the utility of another outcome y is not restricted in accord with the original compromise on the utility of the outcome x.
Consider a setting with four monetary consequences of $0, $200, $500, and $1,000. The utilities of individuals 1 and 2, respectively, for these four consequences are (0,0.2,0.5,1) and (0,0.4,0.75,1) . Assume that individuals 1 and 2 agree that Wi2($500) = 0.55 e (0.5,0.75). Using (4) yields a] = 0.8. Now suppose we choose the outcome $200 and seek a compromise to determine i/^iC^OO). Notice that to be consistent with the original compromise (W|2(500) = 0.55), W52 (200) In theory, agreement on the utility of one outcome is sufficient to completely specify the pair utility. In practice, and assuming that we agree with the normative/prescriptive appeal of the axioms, one should seek compromises on additional points and revisit the agreements to ensure consistency. Further, the ranking of alternatives implied by the pair utility should be displayed. If the individuals do not find the ranking satisfactory, the agreement point should be revisited. Empirically, many experiments report violation of expected utility at the individual level (Kahneman and Tversky 1979, Kagel and Roth 1995) . It is an appealing empirical question to explore how these violations may extend to the pair and group level.
Three Individuals and "No Arbitrage" in the Utility
Comparison Rates A bilateral agreement between individuals 1 and 2 yields u^2-Similarly, a bilateral agreement between individuals 2 and 3 yields Ujy,. We now show tbat these two bilateral agreements are sufficient to derive "]23 (group utility for the case n =3). We could, of course, choose eitber u^j ^^^ t(i3 or w,-i and u-^^ to derive t(i23. Recall that u^ =a 'jUi + (l-a[)ui . Alternatively, we may write U^, = (W^ + 5JH:)/(1 + 6J), wbere the "utility comparison rate" 5| = (1 -aj)/aj e (0, CXJ). In tbe alternative expression for n,^, tbe parameter 5( is the utility comparison rate between / and ;: 8'-tmits of ('s utility are expressed in tbe same units as one unit of j's utility. Tbe order of tbe subscripts and superscripts is important because 5) -l/5j. Henceforth, we use <5, to denote tbe utility comparison rate associated with a bilateral agreement between individuals / and /.
For a geometric illustration of tbe assertion that U]2 arid ((23 are sufficient to determine HI23' refer to Figure 1 . If tbe outcomes in X are finite, tben u, can be tbought of as a vector of utilities or a point in a vector space. Under this interpretation, note that ((,2 is a convex combination of ;/, and 1^2 arid, therefore. Deriving u^^j from u-^-and U2
Hes on the line segment connecting u^ and W2-Similarly, {(23 lies on the line segment connecting ti2 and W3. Now apply (3) to the partition {12, 3). Therefore, W123 must lie somewhere on the line segment connecting £(,2 and i(v Apply (3) again to the partition |1,23) to conclude that (^123 must lie somewhere on tbe line segment connecting u^ and U2j. Tbere is only one point that lies on botb tbe line segments Ti^^ and TTJI^-tbe point t(,2T wbere these two line segments intersect. Tbus, from the two bilateral agreements ((,2 and ((2?' a complete preference ^,23 with utility 1/ 123 emerges. Figure 1 also illustrates tbat tbere is a unique utility candidate for tbe remaining bilateral agreement ((,3-the point wbere tbe line connecting 1(2 and 1(123 intersects line segment u^. Otherwise, the EPR applied to {2,13) would not bold.
The following result, proven in Baucells and Sbapley (2000) , provides the utiUties tbat obtain from this construction. PROPOSITION 
Consider bilateral agreements ((,2 and /(23 ivith utility comparison rates 8] and Sj, respectively. If the EPR holds, then >i23 is complete and has utility Wi23 = Uh + S]U2 + S]u^)/{1 + S] -\-Si). Moreover, if>^^ is a complete preference, then there is a unique utility comparison rate given by Sj = d^Sl so that u^^ = (wj -|-S]u-^)/{\ + SJ).
Group Preferences Based on
Bilateral Agreements For a group of n individuals, tbe group utility, »^j, is obtained by eliciting (H-1) bilateral agreements. For an example, suppose one obtains u^2' "i3' • • • ' "i/r We now know 5^, 5j,... , S'/; that is, tbe utility
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comparison rates between individual 1 and individual i, i = 2 to n. The EPR permits us to write
There are many possible ways (spanning trees) to obtain (n-l) bilateral agreements. For example,
another possibility is to obtain Wi2/"23'
Such a comparison or spanning tree will yield S],Sl,... , S'l^^_^y We can easily obtain 5\ in (5) by the multiplication Sj x 5^ x • • • x 5J,_,|. In general, however, we need to first specify the spanning tree. It is an empirical question whether the choice of a spanning tree systematically influences the derived utility comparison rates or utility weights. The current research makes us presume that such influences may exist. Fischer et al. (1987 Fischer et al. ( , 2000a and von Nitzsch and Weber (1993) report several difficulties and inconsistencies in eliciting attribute weights at the individual level. We expect these inconsistencies to affect the pair behavior too. Recently, Keeney (2002) reviewed these and other more qualitative common mistakes in making value trade-offs. If more than n-1 bilateral agreements are elicited, then the group has to identify f 7 -1 of them to be used in the calculations of the group preference that follows. The other bilateral agreements can be used as consistency checks. For example, in the case of fj = 3, if we ask the pair 11,3) to elicit 5^ and this value differs from 6j6^, then the inconsistency has to be resolved until equality holds.' This is not different from other areas of decision analysis and applied economics where the normative/prescriptive model creates a consistency burden on the descriptive/behavioral reality. Olson et al. (1995, p. 743) conclude, in the context of decision-support systems, that "feedback concerning the consistency of decision maker responses should be regularly provided to make users comfortable and... yield results valuable to users." Sengupta and Te'eni (1993) found that cognitive feedback facilitates group convergence as well. Descriptive research on the influence of the actual spanning tree is critical to incorporate the behavioral and psychological insights in the design of decisionsupport systems (Dyer et al. 1992) . In what follows, wo assume that the decision context and practical considerations will dictate the choice of a spanning tree.
Fix a spanning tree .J on the set of individuals, or a collection of pairs that contains precisely n -1 elements and has no cycles. Consider complete preferences or bilateral agreements for all pairs in 3" and let 8'i, ij e :7, be the corresponding utility comparison rates. To obtain the weights A, that apply to u, in the expression for the group (or coalition) utility, we have to multiply the 5J along the branches of the tree that connect some chosen base agent and individual /. Formally, choose an arbitrary base agent, say / = I, as the "root" of the tree and let S] = \. For / ^ 1, let ?/ "{ be the collection of pairs in the unique path between 1 and / in 7, and define (6) The following proposition in Baucells and Shapley (2000) provides the main result upon which the subsequent developments are based. PROPOSITION 
Assume that any three utilities are linearly independent and that every pair ij in N has complete {but undetermined) preferences. Let 3 he a spanning tree of bilateral agreements {determined pair preferences) and let (A|,... , A,,) be given as in (6). Then, the EPR holds if and only if for all coalition S in N, >^ is complete and has utility (7)
E/ eS
We remark that it is not immediately clear why the As used in u^ have to agree with the As used in u^. In fact, Harsanyi (1963) , Hart and Mas-Colell (1996) , and Maschler and Owen (1992) propose models in cooperative game theory where the As vary with the coalition. Propositions 1 and 2 show that uniqueness of the As for all subsets of N is a consequence of expected utility and EPR.
The interest of Proposition 2 resides in its usefulness in devising a practical procedure for preference aggregation. We will exploit several nice features of Proposition 2. First, it only requires tbe determination of « -1 parameters, namely, tbe « -1 utility comparison rates between pairs of individuals. Second, tbe choice of the n -1 pairs is rather flexible in tbat we can cboose any n -1 pairs that form a spanning tree. Additional criteria may be used so that a particular spanning tree offers more advantages. Tbird, simple manipulations allow us to obtain an alternative representation of tbe group utility as a weigbted sum of utilities of disjoint coalitions (see §4).
Multiattribute (Additive) Group Decisions
We now examine the case where the consequence of a decision is evaluated on multiple attributes. We assume that tbe members of tbe group bave agreed on tbe attributes X^,... ,X^, and eacb individual is able to specify his own utility function for these multiple attributes. An arbitrary multidimensional consequence is denoted . Y = (:c,,... , x,,,), and x^ and .Y° are, respectively, the most preferred and least preferred consequences on attribute a tbat are agreed upon by all individuals. We further assume that each individual's utility function over tbe multiple attributes is additively separable. Tbus, we can write
wbere ^, ,, is tbe importance weight (scaling constant) that individual / attaches to attribute a, 0 < i.ci < 1' LLiiS;,,, = 1, and I?, " is individual I's component utility function (attribute evaluation function) for attribute a, which is normalized by v^ ^(.v^) = 1, /,u(^o) -0, / -1 to », rt = 1 to m. In general, tbe attribute weights and tbe component utilities in (8) will differ across individuals. To obtain tbe pair utility u,^ bowever, an agreement on the weight and the component utility for each attribute is not required. Tbe pair utility u,-^ can be constructed by seeking a compromise on a part of the problem (e.g., on tbe weight tbat individuals / and ) assign to an attribute a). Tbe EPR restricts tbe compromises on other parts of tbe problem if a compromise on one part of tbe problem is reached.
1110
We will discuss tbree different metbods for eliciting bilateral agreements to specify pair utilities wbich, in turn, are used to derive tbe group utility. The group utility so constructed will bave M x m terms. It is interesting to examine whether tbe group utility can be represented as the weighted sum of group attribute utilities (i.e., u^ =fi^v^-\-h^,,f^, wbere jS^ is tbe "group attribute weigbt" for tbe attribute a and i\ is the "group attribute utility" for the attribute a). Surprisingly, as Proposition 4 sbows, we are indeed able to express tbe group utility as the weighted sum of group attribute utilities. From the narrow perspective of simply being able to rank alternatives, it may not seem important bow the group utility is represented so long as it can somehow be assessed. For practical considerations, however, tbe decomposition of tbe group utility into "group attribute weights" and "group attribute utilities" may facilitate communication and implementation. For example, a higber-level policy maker who has delegated tbe responsibility of tbe decision to tbe committee may wisb to interpret tbe group attribute weights as tbe weigbts be will assign to tbe attributes if be were to make the decision on his own. In design of group decisionsupport systems, this representation is an additional output tbat can be given to tbe group to increase tbe understanding of the aggregation procedure and provide further feedback on tbeir inputs (Limayem and DeSanctis 2000) .
The basic idea is to impose the FPR to a larger set of preferences, say >3y, for some Q c N x M (N is the set of individuals {l...«| and M is tbe set of attributes (1... m\). Intuitively, we may tbink tbat eacb individual bas multiple preferences, one for each attribute, and tbat the individual aggregates these preferences using weights ,8, ,p Tbus, we may enlarge the set of "basic" individuals to n x m. Tbe enlarged coalition N X M corresponds to the group utility, and the enlarged coalition [i] x M corresponds to individual (, witb utility w,. Similarly, f, ", tbe attribute evaluation function of individual i, represents tbe preference of the coalition {/) x {a}; and the group attribute evaluation function v^ is tbe preference of tbe coalition
Nx{a\.
For example, application of tbe EPR to all tbe disjoint subsets of \i,j] x M permits us to increase the number of linearity conditions. The preferences of the subset {/, y) x {a\ is interpreted as the pair attribute evaluation; and (;| x M U [j] x {a] corresponds to /' taking into account j's opinion regarding attribute a; and {/| X M\{a\, is i's preferences without taking into account attribute a, etc. We obtain that for all consequences X the following relationships hold; a!)H,, for some a;e(O,l),
for some aj;^"e(0,1), (10) « i! = JlPii.a^ij.a' for some P^j_, Before proceeding with different ways to elicit the previous parameters, we now present a result that links their values leaving only one degree of freedom for each pair of individuals, and ;j -1 degrees of freedom for the group. The intuition behind this result comes from our idea of the spanning tree. If we view u, " as the nodes of the spanning tree, then the fact that w, is a linear combination of the y, " for all fl € M tells us that all the bilateral agreements between any two nodes v, " and i',^ are already in place, with S'f^ -)3, ,,/)8, ,. Thus, once we establish one link between i and ;, then our consistency condition already fills the gaps and establishes all the utility comparison rates between individuals and between attribute evaluation functions. Having imposed the EPR to the attribute evaluation function will allow us to determine some additional parameters that are linked to a[. 
PROOF. Using (9), (10), and (11), we write Because this holds for all x e X, linear independence of the attribute utilities only holds if the coefficients of the z', ,,s are the same. Evaluate this expression at {x'l,... , J:J,'_,, X*, x^' _^ 1... , xj;,) for all a e M to arrive at Equation (12) follows from dividing the two expressions above, and (13) from adding them, Equation (14) follows from replacing a'fl = ,S,^aJ/j8,,^ in (10) and using (13). D With this result in mind, we now present three alternative ways to elicit bilateral agreements among [n -I) pairs of individuals.
Method I: Compromise on Attribute
Evaluation Functions For a given pair of individuals i and ;, and some choice of an attribute a, let z', " and i', " be the corresponding attribute evaluation functions. Next, we fix alternatives x'' = (xj',... , x^'.j,x',x°_^^...,x^) and x' = (Xj,... , x^'_i, x^, x^+1... , x^,) and find some intermediate alternative x = {x{,..., x^'_i,x^,x^'^.j... , x^,) such that i',,,(x) ^ i7^,,,(x). Thus, u,(x) == ^; .u, ,(xj.
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Croup Decisions with Multiple Criteria u,(x'')^Pi,,, and w,(x') = O so that individual / is indifferent between x and a probability mixture p, = z' , ^(x) between x'' and x'. Then, we ask individuals / and / to find a compromise probability p,^ e {p,,p). This says that «,,(x) =B.. ,,D:., or so that so that and Pa-Pi (15) Pj-P^ • P,-P,, Utility comparison rates for individuals i and / for attribute a can also be obtained by seeking a compromise on individuals' certainty equivalents of 50/50 gamble between x'' and x'. If x is the compromise certainty equivalent, then in (15), p = 0.5, pj = t', ^(x), and Pj = v^^{x). The certainty equivalent method is widely used in decision analysis.
Using (12) and (13), we derive the value of the other parameters. Specifically, we obtain that w,, = aju, -f-
{l-a')u^, where a] ^ I/{1-\-8[) and 5\ = (3,,,S'.[l/^i^.
Alternatively, the group utility is represented by where A/,. = «!A.« + (1 -ff!)(8/,,,. Finally, for all beM, u,, h can be expressed as in (14). This possibility of finding pair attribute evaluation functions is the result that we will later extend to u^.
Method II: Compromise on Attribute Weights
An alternative way to elicit the bilateral agreement is by means of comparing the weights given to the different attributes. For a given pair of individuals / and / and some choice of an attribute a, let ;8, ,, and /3^^ be the corresponding weights given to attribute a. Recall that (3i " is interpreted as the utility of alternative x'' = {xl
' and a mixture that with probability /3^ " produces x* or x". If ;3, " ^ 0y ", then we ask the pair to reach a bilateral agreement jQ,: " that falls strictly between ^,^ and /3j " that will be interpreted as the pair utility of x'', or
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Using a\, 8\, (13), and (14), we can compute jS,, â nd Vijj, for all h & M, and write u^j as a linear combination of Vjij,.
Method III:
Compromise on the Willingness to Pay A common procedure widely used in multiattribute applications to elicit the individual weights ^, " is the following. Assuming attribute fl = 1 is the most important, we seek x, so that \X\,X'2,X^, . .. , X,,,) ^, (X]', X|, X-,, . . . , X,,,).
This implies that /3, i Z?^ ,(Xi) = /3, 2. Now, we seek x\ so that (Xj, Xj, X-,, X4, . . . , X,,,) '^, (X, , XJ, X3, X4, . . . , X,,,), which implies /3, ^i', ((xj) =/3, ,, and so on. This method relates all the attribute weights to /3| 1, and we elicit j8, 1 by finding the probability p so that a mixture of X* and x" is indifferent to {x', x^,..., x|),). This implies that ^, j = p. The idea is to get one weight by the lottery method and the others by trade-offs. Notice that if the first attribute is money, then we derive /3, , by finding out how much individual / is willing to pay to raise the value of x. from X2 to xj, and so on. Let x\ be /'s willingness to pay, or (Xj, j , XJ, X;^, . . . , X,,,) .
Similarly, let xj he j's willingness to pay. If xj T^XJ, then we can ask the pair to reach a compromise and seek a pair willingness to pay xJ' 6 {x[, xj). The next step, of coLirse, is to find the a\ and 8\ that follow from xj'. They are given by 
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To derive these expressions, just notice that the agreement in willingness to pay x'^ says
Using U| j = a involving X3,
[u^ + (1 -**')"/ 'I'^d cancelling the terms ... , x,,, produces and the following alternative expression for a\: ,,v,_,{x[) and /3,,2 = ISM^'M^) yields (18). Again, using aj, 5j, (13), and (14), we can computê ,j ,, and I',, ;, for all b e M, and write »,, as a linear combination of the i',, ;,.
We hasten to emphasize that the three methods are supposed to yield the same parameter values of interpersonal comparison. Further, for any given method, the choice of alternatives should yield the same utility comparison rates. Introducing alternative methods has a practical motivation. Several studies in multicriteria decision making have found that subjects prefer transparent and relatively unsophisticated decision models (Buchanan and Daellenbach 1987, Narasimhan and Vickery 1988) . Whereas a probabilistic pair agreement as in (4) would be sufficient in theory, in practice it is helpful to provide additional, more intuitive, elicitation procedures that enhance the reliability of the outcomes and/or manifest certain inconsistencies that otherwise would have passed unnoticed. This normative requirement of individual and pair consistency is unlikely to be met empirically, so that the question of which method yields more reliable results is to be elucidated empirically. See Harte and Koeie (1995) and Zanakis et al. (1998) for current work on this area.
The Main Result
After repeating any of these procedures for « -1 pairs forming a spanning tree, the final results are weights a[ and utility comparison rates 6j, for //' e T. To extend the aggregation procedure, we apply EPR to preferences of rectangular subsets S x M,Sc.N, and E C.M. The interpretation of such preferences is straightforward: The preference of the members of S if they only consider attributes a € E.^ We use (6) The attribute evaluation function v^ corresponds to the utility of the "coalition" A,^ = N x\n\. To expresŝ
We agree with two referees, and thank them for pointing out that preferences for general subsets of N x Al are difficult to interpret, and that it is sufficient to consider rectangular subsets. 
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Finally, Method III is based on willingness to pay. Thus, we begin finding the monetary outcomes that individuals 1 and 2 are willing to pay to move Xj from 0, its worst level, to 100, its best level. By setting we find that xJ ^ 80.5 and xf = 53.8. Now a bilateral agreement takes the form of a compromise in this willingness to pay, xf e (53.8, 80.5) . If this bilateral agreement is to be consistent with the previous one, then x|--74,4 and (18) Of course, in both Method II and Method III the group utility can also be expressed in terms of group attribute evaluation functions i\, upon computing /3|2 " and using Fquation (21).
Coalition Agreements
So far, we have emphasized bilateral agreements and the resulting pairwise utilities as the building blocks for the group utility. If a large number of individuals are involved in a group decision, pairwise comparisons may be too onerous. A more practical procedure may be to divide the group into small coalitions A-^, A2,... , A^^. Then, representatives of each coalition will meet and try to reach an agreement. This is analogous to multiattribute utility theory where trade-offs are generally sought among individual attributes, but sometin^es also among subgroups of attributes.
Because our setting treats individuals and coalitions alike, once we have a partition of the group and utilities for each of these partitions, we can proceed as if these coalitions were the "original" individuals. For example, let n^^ and Uj, be the utilities of two disjoint coalitions A and B. Both u^ and u^ are weighted averages of the individual utilities of the members of A and 6, respectively. Now, instead of some pair agreement between some ( e A and some / G B of the form u, , let the agreement take place at a coalition level. Thus, two representatives from A and B will now try to reach a bilateral agreement at the level of coalitions of the form u^j^ = (»_4 + S5ufl)/(l + 55)-It is immediately clear that if (/ -1 such agreements take place among a spanning tree of the partition A-^, A2. ... , -4,. of M, then group utility l(^y is obtained as before.
The question remains of how such group agreements relate to the hypothetical pair agreements that individuals / and / could have made on their own and that produced the same group utility I/^UB-First, the weight of i in u^ is A,/ Xike/i ^v ^rid the weight of ] in Hg is A./Xlj^gg A;;. Because the utility comparison rate between «^ and u^ is 5j, or Ki^k/Hk^Ah + ^lT./cefl the ratio of weights between », and Uy in u^^yj^ is ' KlT^keAK Of course, we do not have to restrict ourselves to one partition. We could imagine that an intermediate partition may form (filtrations of N), and agreements are formed at higher levels. We now see a picture where individuals may act as portrayers of their own preferences or become representatives of some coalition (say the different departments in a corporation). In the latter case, the individual should reflect the coalition preferences. We leave the investigation of a more general hierarchical coalition structure, appropriate for organizational decision making, as a future research question.
Conversely, having obtained a group utility u^, we could derive the hypothetical utility comparison rates between disjoint coalitions implied by the bilateral agreements. 
Discussion
The key building block in our theory for aggregating individuals' preferences is the bilateral agreement on a chosen parameter (utility of a consequence, weight of an attribute, willingness to pay, etc.) between two individuals or two coalitions. To reach the bilateral agreement, both parties must compromise. In committee decisions, such compromises are common. Nevertheless, bilateral agreements can be difficult to achieve in some circumstances. An interesting research question is to investigate the case where pairs are unable to reach a complete agreement. Technically, one must relax the completeness assumption at the pair level (Baucells and Shapley 2001) . It is quite possible that the preferred set of alternatives is narrowed down considerably even when a consensus cannot be reached on the chosen parameter. The presence of a higher-level decision maker or an arbitrator helps a great deal in narrowing down the agreement zone. In a practical application of choosing a new product design for introduction where Marketing assigned a greater weight to early market entry, but R&D assigned a greater weight to product features and favored a somewhat delayed market entry, the presence of the vice president of the division greatly facilitated an agreement on the importance weights assigned to these attributes (see Sarin 1993) .
We note that our approach may be applicable to decisions under certainty. In this case, individual and group preferences are defined through a measurable value function (Krantz et al. 1971, Dyer and Sarin 1979a, b) . Because the use of lotteries for eliciting utilities and weights may be artificial in decisions under certainty, alternative methods to operationalize our theory need to be explored. One such method may be to seek equal difference points (preference difference between ,v'' and x is the same as that between X and x') and seek compromise on these.
Several authors have noted that many multicriteria problems are resolved in group settings and that these require aggregating individual weights and preferences (Lewis and Butler 1993 , Korhonen et al. 1993 , Harte et al. 1996 , Xanthopulos et al. 2000 . Although applied formal analysis faces many practical difficulties (Kasanen et al. 2000) , our theory provides a systematic way to elicit group preference from individual 1116 preferences. In the widely used additive case, results (20) and (21) of Proposition 4 provide an interesting alternative representation of the group preference.
Decision analysis has a strong tradition of breaking down complex problems into simple parts and then combining the information collected on these parts to reach a decision. In multiattribute decisions, for example, the multiattribute preference function is built from attribute weights and attribute evaluation functions. The attribute weights, for example, are elicited by restricting attention to trade-offs between two attributes at a time. Independence conditions (utility independence, for example) are used to justify a particular decomposition. In a similar vein, our approach uses the EPR to build the group preference from individual and pair preferences. Because the aggregation of preferences is at the heart of a group decision problem, we have provided a theoretically sound way to approach the preference aggregation issue at the simplest level.
Finally, once the EPR is firmly adhered to, our theory can easily accommodate other forms of multiattribute utility functions (multilinear or more general forms). We could consider the case where individual multiattribute utilities are multiplicative (Keeney and Kirkwood 1975, Keeney and Raiffa 1976) . In a so-called homogeneous case where individuals agree on attribute utilities, but not on weights, the group utility takes the multiplicative form and the group multiplicative scaling constant is a weighted sum of individuals' multiplicative constants. In the heterogeneous case (individuals disagree on both attribute utilities and on weights), a group utility can be obtained through bilateral agreements. The structure of the group utility, however, takes a more complex form and does not simplify to an easy-to-interpret multiplicative form. Further research is needed to generalize and interpret our theory to nonadditive multiattribute utility functions.
We believe that the EPR is a much more appealing normative requirement than the exact form of the multiattribute utility function-additive, multiplicative, or some other. It would, however, be interesting to explore the extensions of our theory to cases where the Pareto Rule is relaxed and the group utility is nonlinear. We hope that our work will spark additional theoretical and applied research into the somewhat neglected, but important, area of group decision making.
